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Strengthening a fiscal pillar:
the Uruguayan dual income tax
Alberto Barreix and Jerónimo Roca
This paper presents the new system of dual taxation on income that 
has been introduced in Uruguay to replace the incomplete schedular system 
applying before. The new system strengthens a pillar of taxation defined 
as broadly based and capable of generating substantial and stable tax 
revenues in a country where 60% of fiscal income is consumed by pension 
and interest payments; in addition, the new system redistributes some 
2.5% of total household income. The paper describes the development 
of the system for taxing income, focusing especially on the four changes 
it underwent during the twentieth century. It also compares the different 
models of income tax in use today: (i) the traditional synthetic model, based 
on the Haig-Simons definition of income; (ii) the flat rate model, derived 
from Hall and Rabushka’s consumption tax; (iii) the Nordic dual model, 
which provides for separate taxation of capital income at a fixed rate and 
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Since July 2007, Uruguay has been applying a new 
income tax model that is dual in character. This article 
describes the new model, explains the need for it in 
Uruguay and analyses its redistributive capacity.
The subjects dealt with in the remaining sections 
of this article are as follows. Section II presents a brief 
historical review of income tax, whose structure was 
adapted to the political, economic and social changes 
of the twentieth century.1 Section III analyses the 
different models of income tax currently in use: the 
traditional synthetic model, based on the broad Haig-
Simons definition of income; the flat rate model, with 
its roots in the Hall-Rabushka consumption (cash 
flow) tax; the Nordic dual model, which has separate 
taxation of capital income at a fixed rate and earned 
income at progressive rates; and, lastly, the “Uruguayan 
style” dual model, which takes this central idea of 
the Nordic dual model and incorporates elements of 
simplicity taken from the flat rate model. Section IV 
examines the redistributive capacity of the dual tax 
introduced in Uruguay. Section V, lastly, describes 
the pillars of taxation and analyses their potential in 
Latin America, concluding that there is an urgent need 
to renew the design of income tax, and especially 





A brief historical review
No other tax has undergone the same degree of structural 
development as income tax (or more accurately, the 
taxation system applying to income) as it has adapted 
to changes in international trade and finance, different 
levels of economic and institutional development, 
political and cultural conditions, technological advances 
in the sphere of administration, and different fiscal 
policy models. This complex flexibility turned it into 
the largest revenue-raiser in history during the period 
of greatest revenue growth, the twentieth century.
Unlike value added tax (vat), an instrument of 
efficient and fair trade2 which was pioneered by a 
fledgling (continental) European community in the 
belief that economic integration would bring peace after 
a millennium of conflict, income tax was a result of 
war and social strain. Following its official introduction 
in Great Britain in 1799, for almost two centuries this 
tax was used as an extraordinary income source to 
defray the costs of war or alleviate social tensions, 
either directly as an instrument of income redistribution 
or indirectly for the financing of public expenditure 
at times of social upheaval. Even the most recent 
architectures of the late twentieth century, the dual 
and flat taxes, were motivated by the need to fight for 
savings and investment in an increasingly competitive 
globalized economy.
 The authors are honorary members of the Uruguayan Tax Reform 
Commission and proposed the design for the “Uruguayan style” 
dual income tax in July 2005 in the document “Propuestas para la 
reforma tributaria de Uruguay 2005”. They are grateful to Vito Tanzi, 
Fernando Velayos, Fernando Díaz Yuberos, Martín Bes, Fernando 
Rezende, Ernesto Rezk, Bernal Jiménez, Peter Kalil and Luiz Villela 
for their valuable contributions, and to Patricia Abad for her efficient 
assistance. This paper does not necessarily represent the views of 
the Inter-American Development Bank.
1 Section II summarizes a brief history of income tax included in 
Barreix and Roca (2006), annex 1.
2 The idea of vat can be traced to the papers of the German trader 
von Seimans in the 1920s and was applied for the first time in 
France, in the early post-war years. In the version of it where 
final consumption is used as the tax base following the destination 
principle, it is possible to avoid taxing investment, exporting taxes 
or concealing subsidies.
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The other great difference from vat, that other 
revenue-raising mainstay of our times, concerns 
simplicity of structure and objectives. In its more 
than seven decades of development, vat has had to 
be simplified3 on a consumption and credit method 
basis, and while there are variations in rates and tax 
bases, the primary objective is still to raise revenue 
on an essentially neutral basis. Today more than ever, 
on the other hand, income tax types and rates present 
the most varied structures, ranging from the most 
complex comprehensive models to the simplest flat 
rate systems, with a similar diversity of tax breaks and 
incentives. These dissimilar formats reflect the unstable 
equilibrium between the goals of adequacy, efficiency 
and equity served by this tax.
It is for this reason that income tax was abolished 
and reinstated a number of times in various forms 
and in different countries during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Continuous wars to consolidate 
nation-States and expand empires, the pressure of 
political movements opposed to industrial capitalism, 
and social and technological change made it necessary 
to consolidate and renew the tax. During the twentieth 
century, therefore, income tax, which was the main 
revenue-raising resource, passed through four major 
reformulations.
The first was the “technical” introduction of the 
tax (with the progressive character and administrative 
form we are familiar with today) in the British budget 
of 1909 and in the United States federal Income Tax 
Act of June 1913. The second transformation was 
the “massification” of the tax during the Roosevelt 
administration, around the time of the Second World 
War, in parallel with the spread of democratic 
participation and public action through social welfare 
programmes. Sustained by the success of the New 
Deal and the reconstruction of Western Europe, and 
by a skewed interpretation of Keynesianism, public 
spending growth created a huge demand for fiscal 
resources. This pressure led to a spiral of increases 
in income tax rates, counteracted by a proliferation 
of exemptions and special treatment that distorted the 
structure of the tax. The third phase was a reaction, the 
“counter-reform” of the Thatcher administration, and 
to an even greater degree the Reagan administration, 
in the 1980s, which restored the original composition 
of the tax by sharply reducing rates and expanding the 
tax base, without significantly affecting either the tax 
take or the factor burden. In the fourth reformulation 
of the early 1990s, lastly, innovations came “from the 
cold”: the dual model of the Nordic countries and the 
flat tax of the new market economies (countries of the 
former Soviet bloc) adapted income tax to cope with 
international competition for saving and investment 
while maintaining (in part) its progressive character.
1. the four adaptive mutations of income tax 
in the twentieth century
(a) Conflicts of region, class and power: the birth 
of the progressive, personalized income tax
In June 1913, when 42 states ratified the Sixteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution allowing the United 
States Congress to tax income at the federal level, 
the relationship between classes, between regions and 
between centres of authority in the country shifted. The 
approval of income tax marked the end of the “republican 
system” of taxation built up by the party Lincoln had 
founded. This system was based on protectionist 
customs tariffs favouring the industrialization of the 
country’s north at the expense of the south, which was 
where raw materials were produced. The south did not 
accept this, but was defeated in the Civil War.
As for class, tariffs represented a subsidy to the 
great industrial enterprises and a charge on farmers and 
consumers. In addition, large companies had integrated 
vertically and made technological advances, tapping 
a larger market than their European competitors’ and 
an unregulated labour supply fed by large flows of 
migrants; all this added up to copious profits (Brownlee, 
2004; Steuerle, 2004). The “republican system” of 
taxation was a precursor of the import substitution 
model, except that the United States succeeded in 
consolidating a large economic space (market). Latin 
America, on the other hand, divided into numerous very 
different jurisdictions, has not succeeded in integrating 
even to the modest extent of creating subregional free 
trade areas.
On the other side of the Atlantic, industrialization 
brought greater democratization (influence of the House 
of Commons) within the peculiar British political 
system, leading to the overwhelming Liberal victory 
of 1906. Under the influence of David Lloyd George, 
a social reformer, old-age pensions were approved in 
3 It is fair to say that vat presents problems of (i) revenue reversal, 
as in the case of financial services or sales of second-hand items; 
(ii) administration in sectors such as real estate, agriculture and 
microenterprise; (iii) distribution to lower levels of government, 
given that it is by nature a national tax; and (iv) regressiveness, as 
it is a tax on consumption.
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1908, and the famous 1911 budget brought in sickness 
and unemployment insurance of a Bismarckian hue. 
Politically, the influence of the House of Lords was 
reduced when the Liberals overcame its opposition to 
the income tax in the “people’s budget” of 1909.
Technically, income tax was driven throughout the 
twentieth century by the emergence of tax instruments 
(Tanzi, 2006) based on advances in other disciplines such 
as bookkeeping and administration. For example, advances 
with bookkeeping made it possible to record company 
revenue flows more accurately, and the appearance of 
large enterprises meant that deductions could be made 
from the incomes of a growing class of wage earners, 
reducing administration and compliance costs.
(b) The new role of the State, the predominance of 
fiscal policy and the large-scale application of 
income tax
President Franklin D. Roosevelt not only revived 
his country after the greatest crisis capitalism had 
experienced (the Great Depression) and set in train the 
military victory over corporative dictatorships around 
the world, but also expanded the goals and framework of 
State action, expressing them in a new social contract, 
the New Deal. One result was an expanded role for the 
State in stabilizing the economy and thus in running 
certain activities, and in providing benefits through a 
more comprehensive social security system.4 To these 
two drivers of public spending growth was added the 
military effort of the Second World War. To finance all 
this, income tax was applied on a massive scale.
Technically, Simons’ def inition of economic 
income (consumption plus change in net wealth) 
prevailed from the 1930s onward, and this made it 
possible to establish progressivity with redistributive 
effects and horizontal equity.
Continually rising rates, accompanied by a 
shrinking of the tax base due to the introduction of 
tax breaks and loopholes (whose purpose was to avoid 
possible negative effects on saving, the labour supply and 
venture capital investment), were characteristic of the 
federal income tax during the Roosevelt administration 
and were to dominate the tax landscape of the developed 
Western economies for the next 40 years.
In summary, the (reactive) increase in fiscal revenues 
was once again a consequence of growing demand for 
public infrastructure and social services stemming from 
the political maturation of the industrial revolution, and 
of the war effort. Between 1920 and 1960, on average, 
fiscal pressure more than doubled in the developed 
countries, total public spending grew by over 50% 
and social spending trebled (table 1). And income tax 
responded once again, growing almost out of recognition 
but reaffirming its capacity to adapt to social changes and 
take advantage of technological innovation.
(c) The “counter-reform”: a return to lower rates 
and a broader base
From the immediate post-war period to the late 
1970s, State activity expanded unceasingly with 
reconstruction in Europe and the “Great Society”5 
project in the United States. Sustained by an exaggerated 
version of Keynesianism and the early growth of the 
planned economies, it took fiscal pressure to levels of 
close to 50% of gross domestic product (gdp) and upper 
marginal income tax rates to 90%. The reform of this 
tax in the United States in 1986, like the earlier reforms 
by the Thatcher administration in the United Kingdom, 
broadened tax bases and reduced tax expenditure, 
particularly “corporate welfare” for large enterprises, 
while at the same time lowering rates in what constituted 
a return of income tax to its roots.
One of the most important reasons for reducing very 
high tax rates in developed countries (averaging over 
70% in the 1970s) was to sustain saving and investment 
in an increasingly open world. These countries had 
been liberalizing trade and finance for over a quarter 
of a century. Average customs tariffs were below 5% 
and trade diversion had also diminished, although there 
were still some non-tariff barriers affecting agricultural 
products in particular. Lower tariffs, especially for 
manufactures, led to a gradual deindustrialization of the 
developed countries, while at the same time international 
competition was increasing.
It is important to realize that trade and financial 
liberalization was also influenced by the need to 
support the new dynamic sectors (“new economy”). 
With liberalized trade and less customs protection, 
the profitability of the manufacturing sector declined. 
Broad-based income taxes with low rates favoured 
4 The Roosevelt administration promoted the idea of State protection 
to provide individuals with at least a minimum level of welfare (in 
respect of poverty, unemployment and pensions) throughout their 
lives, adding functions to the Hamiltonian version of government 
that prevailed in the United States.
5 It aimed for an end to poverty and social injustice (Lyndon Johnson) 
to build on Roosevelt’s mass social security programme.
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risk-taking in the new businesses: finance, knowledge 
technology and entertainment. Thus, investment 
opportunities increased for higher-income groups and 
bureaucracies became more active, winning acceptance 
for the abolition of particular incentives (privileges).
The rate reductions applied in the 1980s in these 
two leading, harmonized and growing markets led to 
a realignment of income tax around the world in an 
increasingly intertwined global economy. Thus, in one 
decade the average reduction in top marginal personal 
income tax rates was almost 34%, while the reduction 
for corporation tax was almost 28%. Yet the fiscal yield 
and the tax burden on factors of production remained 
virtually unchanged.6
In summary, the old principle of progressive 
taxation through income tax was asserted without 
loss of revenue during the Reagan administration, 
harmonizing with the revolt against the enlargement of 
the public sector.7 Although the growth of government 
was checked during the 1980s, however, fiscal pressure 
increased by 50% between 1960 and the end of the 
twentieth century, while public social spending doubled 
(table 1).
TABLE 1
Developed countries: government revenues and total and social public spending,a 
around 1870 and selected years of the twentieth century
(Percentages of gross domestic product)
 Government revenue Total public spending Public social spending
 Circa    Circa    Circa
 1870 1920 1960 1996 1870 1920 1960 1996 1880 1920 1960 1995
Australia 17.8 19.4 24.4 35.0 18.3 19.3 21.2 35.9 1.1 2.8 7.4 14.8
Austriab … 9.0 37.9 47.8 10.5 14.7 35.7 51.6 ... 3.7 15.9 21.4
Belgiumb c  11.6 17.0 30.3 49.8 … 22.1 30.3 52.9 1.3 2.6 13.1 27.1
Canadab 4.1 16.6 26.0 42.7 … 16.7 28.6 44.7 1.3 1.3 9.1 18.1
France 15.3 17.9 37.3 50.3 12.6 27.6 34.6 55.0 1.3 2.4 13.4 26.9
Germanyb 1.4 8.6 35.2 45.3 10.0 25.0 32.4 49.1 2.0 7.5 18.1 24.9
Hollandb c ... 11.8 33.9 47.3 9.1 13.5 33.7 49.3 1.5 2.5 11.7 25.7
Ireland 9.6 23.2 27.5 36.5 ... 18.8 28.0 42.0 … 7.0 8.7 18.3
Italy 12.5 24.2 24.8 46.2 13.7 30.1 30.1 52.7 0.6 1.7 13.1 23.7
Japan 9.5 … 18.8 31.7 8.8 14.8 17.5 35.9 0.3 2.3 4.1 12.3
Norway 4.3 11.5 32.4 51.4 5.9 16.0 29.9 49.2 1.2 3.9 7.8 27.5
Spainb c  9.4 5.8 18.7 39.0 ... 8.3 18.8 43.7 0.3 1.7 13.9 19.0
Swedenb 9.5 7.2 32.5 62.1 5.7 10.9 31.0 64.2 2.0 3.6 10.8 33.1
Switzerlandb … 3.8 23.3 36.4 16.5 17.0 17.2 39.4 2.8 2.2 4.9 18.9
United Kingdom  8.7 20.1 29.9 37.2 9.4 26.2 32.2 43.0 1.2 6.2 10.2 22.5
United States 7.4 12.4 27.6 31.6 7.3 12.1 27.0 32.4 1.1 2.2 7.3 13.7
Average 9.3 13.9 28.8 43.1 10.7 18.3 28.0 46.3 1.3 3.4 10.6 21.7
Growth %  49% 107% 50%  72% 53% 65%  160% 216% 105%
Source: Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) and Lindert (2004).
a Includes poverty and unemployment relief, education, pensions, health care and housing subsidies.
b The figures for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Holland (later the Netherlands), Spain, Sweden and Switzerland are for central 
government only up to 1937.
c The figures for Belgium, Holland (later the Netherlands) and Spain are for central government only up to 1920.
6 Boscá, García and Taguas (2005) analysed average effective tax 
rates for capital and labour using a database for 21 countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd) 
in the 1965-2001 period. What the analysis shows is that the tax 
burden in the United States has risen since 1986 for both capital and 
labour, although the tax burden on labour grew by 13% more; in 
the United Kingdom, meanwhile, both rates fell up to 1997. In the 
other oecd countries, tax burdens on factors of production changed 
only very moderately. Data from the oecd and European Union (15 
countries) also reveal a slight increase in the income tax take: between 
1979/1980 and 1989/1990, it rose from 12.48% and 12.51% of gdp, 
respectively, to 13.1% and 13.8%.
7 The richest quintile in the United States paid an effective rate of 
27.6% in 1980, falling to 25.5% in 1990, while its share of pre-tax 
income rose by 4.4% in the same period (from 31.7% to 36.1%).
126
strENgthENiNg A FisCAL PiLLAr: thE uruguAYAN DuAL iNComE tAx  •  ALBErto BArrEix AND JEróNimo roCA
C E P A L  r E v i E w  9 2  •  A u g u s t  2 0 0 7
(d) The innovation “from the cold”: 
competitiveness without loss of equity
In the last decade of the twentieth century, for 
reasons of efficiency and administrative convenience, 
the Nordic economies, which are among the world’s 
most competitive, introduced a dual system of taxation 
giving different treatment to income from capital (both 
saving and investment), which has become increasingly 
mobile. The Nordic countries formalized “dual income 
tax”, but it is only fair to acknowledge, as will be seen, 
that most tax laws had already introduced some degree 
of duality, making the treatment of capital gains and 
interest more favourable.
In the new market economies, meanwhile, income 
tax was turned into a single rate (flat) tax for income 
of all kinds, with a high exemption threshold that 
conferred vertical equity upon the tax while releasing a 
large percentage of the population from the obligation 
of paying it. Combined with the small number of 
permissible deductions, this considerably facilitated the 
work of newly created tax administrations. The flat tax 
was introduced in Estonia in 1994, but became more 
visible when the Russian Federation adopted it in 2001. 
Lithuania and Latvia followed their Baltic neighbour in 
the first wave of this tax and after 2004 it also spread 
to Slovakia, Georgia, Rumania and Ukraine.8
For the first time, change has been led not by the 
major powers but by small economies whose sights are 
set on international competitiveness rather than on some 
external or internal political enemy. The purpose of 
these changes is to maintain the progressivity of the tax 
and its ability to raise funds for the financing of social 
policies (especially growing pension spending) and to 
simplify compliance and administrative oversight (given 
the weakness of institutions and the disadvantages they 
work under by comparison with large multinational 
and regional corporations, since effective cooperation 
between jurisdictions is lacking). This latest development 
in the structure of the tax, in its dual and flat forms, will 
be analysed in greater detail in the following section.
III
Different models of income tax
In the world generally, and in Latin America in 
particular, a very wide range of income tax models 
coexist for all three components of the tax: personal, 
corporate and international. The range runs from 
Mexico with its Haig-Simons type income tax system 
that includes worldwide income, sophisticated taxation 
of inflation-adjusted capital income and full integration 
between personal income tax and corporation tax, to 
Paraguay with an almost flat tax presenting a rate of 
10% on personal incomes (the same as the general 
vat rate) and 20% on corporate income of Paraguayan 
origin.
There now follows a comparative analysis of 
the four income tax models in use: the synthetic (or 
comprehensive) model, the flat rate model, the Nordic 
dual model and, lastly, the Uruguayan dual model.
1. synthetic income tax
This income tax structure, also known as integrated tax, 
combines (integrates) all the incomes of the taxpayer 
(the individual or family) and taxes them in accordance 
with a structure of progressive marginal rates applied 
to income brackets. The tax follows the Haig-Simons 
broad definition of income: consumption plus change 
in wealth over a given period.
The theoretical advantages of this model are clear 
although, as will be seen later, serious doubt has been 
cast over them in practice. Among these advantages 
are: (i) including “all” income (Haig-Simons broad 
definition), giving equal treatment to income from 
employment and capital and allowing deductions in 
the tax base and reductions in the tax amount to be 
paid facilitates personalization of the tax and serves 
the interests of horizontal equity (i.e., taxpayers with 
the same payment capacity actually do pay the same 
amount) and (ii) conferring progressivity on the tax by 
means of progressive marginal rates (vertical equity), 
assuming the tax authority collects it effectively, even 
at high marginal rates.
8 Flat rates vary from country to country, ranging from 12% to 
33% for personal income tax (with different personal deductions 
for the taxpayer and per dependent) and from 16% to 37% for 
corporation tax.
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As we have said, though, the facts have cast doubt 
on these virtues of synthetic personal income tax. For 
example, its application has usually been associated 
with “pick and choose” deductions whose purpose 
is to encourage particular forms of behaviour. In 
other words, the government indicates what types of 
activities are to be favoured,9 in accordance with its 
policy decisions, and the individual chooses. Leaving 
aside the issue of whether it is right for the tax system 
to be used to encourage particular types of behaviour 
among economic agents, it is clear that a larger 
number of deductions means a smaller tax base, so 
that marginal rates have to be higher if revenue loss 
is to be avoided.
If account is also taken of the opportunities that 
financial liberalization provides for capital, the most 
mobile factor, then the stage is set for an outflow of 
savings. When financial capital (savings) is taxed at 
very high marginal rates (the marginal rate is what 
influences the decision to save), those receiving the 
income from it, who belong to the wealthiest strata, tend 
to shift savings to jurisdictions with low or zero taxes. 
This destroys both horizontal and vertical equity.10 As 
will be seen, the dual income tax model of the Nordic 
countries can be viewed as a response to this flight of 
savings associated with personal income tax.
This problem is compounded by the administrative 
complexity of synthetic personal income tax. For 
example:
(i) the welter of deductions generates high 
administration and/or compliance costs;
(ii) to prevent the unintended incentives of traditional 
taxation (double taxation of dividends, first at the 
corporate and then at the personal level), different 
mechanisms have been sought to integrate 
corporation tax and personal income tax, which 
creates administrative difficulties; and
(iii) correcting excessive progressivity when incomes 
are irregular also creates difficulties in determining 
tax periods.
2. the response to the administrative 
complexity of synthetic taxation: the flat tax
Given the administrative complexity of synthetic 
personal income tax, and to correct the scope for 
arbitrage created by the difference between corporate 
and personal income tax rates, Hall and Rabushka (1983 
and 1995) proposed a combination of two taxes with 
the same rate:
(i) a tax on the real financial flows of companies 
(cash flow type), i.e., on sales (including exports) 
minus wages, inputs and investment (which can be 
deducted in full at the time it is carried out), and
(ii) a tax on wages, with a non-taxable personal 
allowance to provide a degree of progressivity 
despite the tax being levied at a flat rate.
Saving is not tax-deductible at the time it is 
carried out, nor is the yield on it taxed subsequently. 
That is, there is no tax on interest, dividends or capital 
gains, and companies cannot deduct interest paid.11 To 
put it more clearly, banks do not pay corporation tax 
under this system. It is easy to show that, from a life 
cycle perspective, this design taxes consumption.12 
Furthermore, it acts as a consumption base vat 
working on the origin principle and calculated by the 
subtraction method.
The only major similarity between the flat tax 
introduced in some countries (Estonia, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, Slovakia and Rumania) 
and Hall and Rabushka’s system is the existence of a flat 
tax on wages. The main differences, meanwhile, are in 
(i) the method of establishing the tax-exempt allowance; 
(ii) the fact that some have taxed capital income and 
others have not; and (iii) the fact that they have all kept 
the traditional corporation tax, and not necessarily at 
the same rate as the tax on earned income.
Although a long way from Hall and Rabushka’s 
proposal, the flat tax applied does simplify administration. 
For example: (i) the application of withholding tax is 
more straightforward; (ii) the problem referred to earlier 
of excessive progressivity when incomes are irregular 
is done away with; (iii) there are fewer incentives 
to shift income between related taxpayers (spouses), 
9 In our view, there are basically two types of deductions (or credits): 
those that aim to mitigate the effect of the income tax on saving, 
and those that give privileged treatment to activities believed to have 
positive externalities (health care, education, etc.), although targeted 
spending is acknowledged to be the most efficient option.
10 The special deduction for wage-paying employment applied 
in many countries is a form of compensation and an implicit 
acknowledgement of this inequity.
11 Interest is a transfer that does not generate value added if it takes 
place between residents. When it is not deductible, taxation ceases to 
be a consideration in assessing the optimum financial mix.
12 A tax on wages over the whole life cycle, assuming no stock of 
savings remains at the end, is equivalent to a consumption tax at 
present value. If savings do remain, this observation holds true if 
an inheritance tax is added.
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although they do not disappear completely owing to 
the existence of the personal tax allowance; and lastly 
(iv) if the corporation tax rate is made the same as the 
rate for earned income (as in the Slovak Republic and 
Rumania), there is no longer an incentive for people 
to set up companies to reduce the tax burden on their 
economic activities.
As Keen, Kim and Varsano (2006) point out, the 
greater simplicity of income tax in these countries has 
nothing to do with its flat rate structure. What they have 
done is to set a personal allowance level that is high 
enough to leave a large percentage of the population 
outside the tax net, and allow only a limited number 
of deductions.
The main problem with the flat tax is that the rate 
needed to maintain the pre-reform tax take is too high for 
capital income. As a result, this flat tax, like the synthetic 
tax, displaces saving (i.e., causes capital flight).
3. the answer to capital flight: “dualization” 
of the synthetic tax and the dual tax of the 
Nordic countries
If Hall and Rabushka’s proposal can be seen as a 
response to the administrative complexity of synthetic 
personal income tax, the dual system of income tax 
applied by the Nordic countries can be seen as a 
response to the capital flight also associated with the 
synthetic tax. Strictly speaking, some degree of duality 
began to be applied in the treatment of capital gains 
and interest during the 1980s as a first response to 
this mobility of savings. In the case of capital gains, 
most countries established a differential rate below the 
top marginal rate of personal income tax. The United 
States is a typical case: capital gains made over a period 
greater than a year are taxed at a flat rate of 15%. As 
for interest, developing countries began to establish a 
schedular system with lower rates. This was done in 
Latin America by Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, for example.
In the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden), the flight of savings was 
compounded by the problem that their integrated 
systems had much higher marginal rates than those of 
other countries (up to 73% in Denmark and Sweden), 
while at the same time the tax base was narrow because 
of special treatment and exemptions for certain types of 
capital income and full deduction of interest payments 
(mortgage interest in particular) at these high marginal 
rates. Special treatment for capital income was part of 
a (disorderly) attempt to make their tax systems more 
attractive and prevent the flight of savings because 
of a lack of cooperation between tax administrations. 
But the integrated system thus designed contained 
strong incentives for avoidance through tax planning, 
produced a negative yield on capital income and was 
more progressive in theory than in practice (Picos 
Sánchez, 2003).
Consequently, between 1987 and 1993 the Nordic 
countries formalized the dual income tax. Basically, 
this gives separate tax treatment to earned income 
(taxed at progressive rates) and capital income (taxed at 
proportional rates), whether from business operations or 
passive investment. As figure 1 shows, the Nordic dual 
tax “anchors” the rate applicable to corporate income 
and capital income (around 30%), which in turn is the 
lower rate for the tax on earned income, this being taxed 
progressively up to rates of around 50%.
With this design there is no scope for arbitrage, 
either by abusing capital income to obtain business 
income (both taxed at the same rate) or by passing off 
business income as earned income (paying oneself a 
salary instead of collecting dividends). Nonetheless, 
physical persons with mixed incomes (own-account 
workers, sole proprietors and partnerships) do have 
a strong incentive to pass off their earned income 
as business income. Many experts regard this as the 
Achilles heel of the Nordic dual system.
Something similar is true of Chile, where business 
income is subject to a system of taxation based on 
withdrawals: retained profits are taxed at 17%, while 
distributed profits, which are included in the synthetic 
personal income tax along with the taxpayer’s other 
income, may be subject to the top marginal rate of 40%. 
This large difference creates a strong incentive to retain 
profits. According to data from the Chilean Internal 
Revenue Service (sii), there are more than 30,000 
investment companies created exclusively to administer 
retained profits, and over 50% of undistributed profits 
accumulate in companies of this type. This “deferral 
cost” (more crudely put, personal income disguised 
as business income) is over 2% of gdp, while the tax 
take from personal income tax is somewhat below that 
figure (sii, 2006). That so much tax should be foregone 
is surprising considering that tax expenditure is only 
0.6% of gdp for corporation tax and 0.9% for vat, 
which collects 8.5% of gdp.
4. the uruguayan dual income tax
Contrary to what is usually claimed, Uruguay already 
had a personal income tax before the tax reform that 
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came into force in July 2007; more precisely, it had 
an incomplete schedular type income tax system 
whereby different taxes were applied to particular types 
of income at different rates, leaving other incomes 
unaffected. For example, the personal receipts tax 
(impuesto a las retribuciones personales—irp) affected 
wages, pensions and unemployment insurance; the 
commissions tax (impuesto a las comisiones) affected 
a large number of non-professional service providers 
(customs agents, currency dealers, salespeople, etc.); 
the income of sole traders was subject to corporation 
tax. However, other income, such as that from 
professional services, interest, rent and capital gains, 
was not taxed.
These taxes on income were supplemented by a 
number of lesser taxes that were inefficient (causing 
distortions) and/or expensive to administer and comply 
with. Many of them came out of the continual “fiscal 
reforms” of the 1990s —actually minor adjustments 
that worsened the quality of the tax system. In the 13 
years from 1990 to 2002, 13 taxes were introduced, or 
exactly one a year.13 The introduction of the dual tax 
meant that most of them could be repealed.
The need to resolve the design problems of the 
incomplete schedular income tax system was one of 
the reasons for overhauling it. These problems included 
the following:
(i) the system was not comprehensive, i.e., did not 
cover all income. This was a clear violation of the 
principle of horizontal equity (same treatment for 
taxpayers with the same ability to pay);
(ii) it did not attain vertical equity, since most earned 
incomes, including income from businesses, were 
taxed at high rates, while most types of capital 
income, going predominantly to the higher-income 
strata, were exempt.
(iii) because the system consisted of an assortment 
of taxes with different bases and different rates, 
it created numerous opportunities for arbitrage, 
one example being back-to-back loans whereby 
business owners lent money (interest exempt) 
through a third person to their own company 
(interest deductible). This is reflected in the ratio 
between corporate income and assets in 1993-
1997: while this ratio averaged about 3.5% for 
industry and services, the average for banks was 
0.08%, i.e., less than 1‰ (Barreix, 2003).
The new Uruguayan dual income tax takes from 
the Nordic dual system the core idea of taxing earned 
income separately (at progressive rates) from capital 
income (proportional rate). In other words, it establishes 
a lower tax rate for capital yields (interest, dividends 
and profits, rents, capital gains) which is the same as 
FIGURE 1
Nordic dual income tax














13 To name a few: social security financing contribution tax (cofis, a 
kind of wholesalers’ vat), bank asset tax (imaba), financial system 
oversight tax (icosifi), credit card tax, sportsmen’s transfer tax, 
forced sales tax, lottery tax, tax on the sale of movable property 
by public auction.
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the bottom marginal rate for earned income. This rate 
is the “anchor” of the system, the lowest rate at which 
income begins to be taxed.14 In turn, the top marginal 
rate on earned income is the same as the rate for (net) 
business income.
The political debate in Uruguay led to the decision 
that the single all-in tax rate15 on capital incomes would 
be 12%, and would thus not be the same as the 10% 
bottom marginal rate on earned income (figure 2). Taxes 
on earned incomes range up to 25%, which is also the 
rate for business income.
The Uruguayan dual rate, therefore, limits 
the scope for arbitrage offered by the Nordic dual 
system, to the point where physical persons providing 
professional services or obtaining business type 
incomes are free to choose whether to pay corporation 
tax or personal income tax. The system is designed so 
that, for example, self-employed taxpayers can choose 
between paying as businesses at a nominal rate of 
25% on net income (after deduction of all admissible 
business expenses) or paying as physical persons 
under the system of earned income brackets, whose 
top marginal rate is also 25%; in this latter case, they 
cannot discount business expenses but only personal 
expenses (social security contributions, payments for 
their children’s health care and a set percentage of 30% 
for expenses). Self-employed taxpayers who are “large” 
(employing professionals and having a substantial 
infrastructure, for example) will undoubtedly choose 
to pay tax as corporations to be able to deduct their 
expenses. Those who are “small” may be better off 
paying as physical persons, something that makes 
economic sense given that labour is bound to be the 
main factor of production in their work (and the system 
does not set out to punish them by taxing them as 
though they were acting predominantly as employers). 
This is not arbitrage; for arbitrage to exist, there has 
to be a dominant strategy whereby the taxpayer always 
gains by dissimulation.
Meanwhile, the possibility of arbitrage between 
business income and gross capital income is resolved 
by the customary rules of corporation tax.16 The 
solution the reform opted for to prevent arbitrage 
when interest (taxed at 12%) is deducted to calculate 
FIGURE 2
uruguayan dual income tax















14 It is recognized that capital gains and royalties are not gross 
income. Accordingly, Barreix and Roca (2005) proposed that 
they should be taxed at a higher rate (15%), but administrative 
considerations, particularly as regards international income, led to a 
flat rate being adopted. It was also proposed that technical assistance 
from non-residents and dividends paid abroad should likewise be 
taxed at this rate.
15 The deduction at source is final and releases the taxpayer from 
any obligation of declaration or identification.
16 By applying the payment credit method to retained capital income, 
together with thin capitalization rules for interest and/or deduction 
limits for capital income when business income is calculated.
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business income (taxed at 25%) was to require that the 
deduction matched the proportion between the all-in 
withholding tax rate applied to capital and the business 
income rate (i.e., 12/25).
Lastly, the Uruguayan dual system follows the 
flat tax in setting a tax allowance that leaves a large 
proportion of the population (60%) outside the tax net 
and in allowing only a small number of deductions, 
thereby facilitating administration and preventing the 
erosion of the tax base (and the lobbying) that are 
a feature of the synthetic model, especially in Latin 
America.17
The reform of personal income tax in Spain, 
which was formulated in 2006 and came into force 
on 1 January 2007, implemented a dual model closer 
to the “Uruguayan style” dual tax than to the Nordic 
dual tax. The lowest rate at which income begins to be 
taxed is for capital income (18%), and is close to the 
bottom marginal rate for earned income (24%). The top 
marginal rate on earned income, meanwhile, is 43%; 
given the deductions allowed and the tax on dividends, 
this rate discourages physical persons from setting up 
as companies (taxed at 30%) to conduct their economic 
activities. Regarding the possible abuse of interest in 
obtaining business income, reliance is placed on thin 
capitalization rules.
At this point in the analysis of taxation models, 
it is worth asking why a dual system was chosen 
for Uruguay. The answer is that the decision was 
influenced by reasons of an administrative nature and 
by considerations of efficiency.
Among the administrative reasons are the 
following: first, at a time when mercosur is still 
incomplete, Uruguay is obliged to follow a “small 
country” strategy that aims to capture external savings, 
by contrast with the “big country” strategy followed 
by Argentina and Brazil, whose aim is rather to secure 
foreign direct investment. This strategy does not 
permit high marginal rates like those of the traditional 
synthetic model. Similarly, the flat rate necessary 
to generate the same amount of income tax revenue 
(from companies, individuals and non-residents) as 
the Uruguayan dual tax is expected to yield would be 
around 19%; for capital income this rate would be too 
high, encouraging the flight of savings.
Second, the low quality of tax administration in 
Uruguay means that the new income tax system has 
to be straightforward. The model approved is easy to 
comply with and oversee because:
(i) capital income, whether received by residents or 
non-residents, is taxed at a flat all-in withholding 
rate;
(ii) 60% of the total population are left outside the 
income tax net, so that a fifth of the population 
that was affected by the personal receipts tax (irp), 
now abolished, will be unaffected by the dual tax; 
in addition, 80% of this tax will be paid by the 
wealthiest 20% of the population;
(iii) it allows few deductions (just three: social security 
contributions, health insurance contributions and 
deductions per child or dependent), which are easy 
to calculate;
(iv) it prevents tax arbitrage between taxpayers’ 
different income types and/or legal status, thereby 
reducing incentives for evasion or tax-driven 
changes in saving portfolios; and
(v) it raises more revenue than the incomplete 
schedular tax, making it possible to do away with 
inefficient taxes (imaba, cofis and others) and 
thus simplifying the system.
Third, the proposed design allows Uruguay to 
retain bank (tax) secrecy without being regarded as 
a tax haven.
It should be stated here that we are not supporters 
of bank secrecy. It creates information asymmetry, 
leading in turn to market failure (Stiglitz and Grossman, 
1980), by depriving partner countries of the ability to 
apply taxes or combat fiscal fraud and thereby finance 
part of their public spending. In essence, this means 
exporting a tax base (Tanzi, 2001). However, we 
believe that the current situation in mercosur forces 
Uruguay to use tax (bank) secrecy as a negotiating 
tool. The fact is that as long as mercosur is not 
perceived as a consolidated customs union (it does not 
have a common trade policy, it lacks a serious dispute 
resolution system and customs controls are abused), 
investment will tend to go to the largest market, chiefly 
Brazil and then Argentina, and this will be reinforced 
by the incentives offered by these countries. For this 
reason, Uruguay’s share of foreign direct investment 
(about 3%) is significantly lower than its share of the 
bloc’s gdp (about 5%).
17 In the tax base constituted by earned income, the personal tax 
allowance is approximately 70% of per capita gdp, i.e., more than 
twice the value of the basket used to calculate the absolute poverty 
line. There is no provision for a tax-exempt allowance in the capital 
income tax base and nor, for reasons of bank secrecy, is offsetting of 
capital income allowed (other than rents). The deductions authorized 
in the earned income tax base are contributions to pension plans (both 
compulsory and voluntary) and health expenditure by the taxpayer 
and the taxpayer’s children while minors, up to a certain limit.
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The main criterion used by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development to define tax 
havens is that they impose low or no taxes on saving 
income (oecd, 2005). By taxing capital income at 
substantial all-in rates, the Uruguayan dual tax makes it 
impossible for Uruguay to be regarded as a tax haven, 
since it does not meet this criterion. This provides a 
reaffirmation of legal security, while the all-in tax 
allows the depositor’s identity to remain confidential. 
The result is to make the country even more attractive 
for domestic or external savers, who take decisions by 
assessing the trade-off between returns and security.
Regarding considerations of efficiency, Feldstein 
(2006) argues that taxing capital income at high rates 
gives rise to two types of problems:
(i) the loss of efficiency associated with a tax on 
saving should be measured not by the reduction 
in its current level but by the drop in the future 
consumption that today’s saving will be able to 
buy, meaning that it is substantially greater than 
the loss usually estimated; and
(ii) high taxes on capital income lead to inefficiencies 
in the allocation of capital. For example, a 
high rate of tax on dividends discourages their 
distribution (lock-in effect), with the following 
consequences: first, it results in a loss of efficiency 
in investment choices; second, it is a disincentive 
to discipline for managers, who have privileged 
access to internal financing; third, it can even 
lead to a lower tax take than would be obtained 
by taxing investment (or consumption).18
As pointed out earlier, Chile is a case study 
in this respect. The strong incentive represented by 
the difference between the rates on undistributed 
profits (17%) and distributed profits (up to 40%) has 
led to a situation, according to estimates by the tax 
administration (sii), in which retained profits total 2% 
of gdp (sii, 2006). Furthermore, Cantallopts, Jorrat and 
Scherman (2007) state that retained profits are more 
heavily concentrated than other income, revealing the 
loss of vertical equity associated with this design.
IV
the progressivity and redistribution capacity of 
the uruguayan dual tax
The need to maintain a tax burden of about 30% of 
gdp means that indirect taxes (15% of gdp in 2005) 
and pension contributions (7%) account for a large 
share of the tax structure, making it regressive. The 
need to temper these adverse effects on equity is 
a second reason for introducing a comprehensive, 
progressive personal income tax, especially given 
that the limited fiscal revenues available19 leave very 
few resources free for financing redistributive public 
social spending, which is the most suitable instrument. 
Available fiscal revenue in the country, defined as tax 
revenues (30.4% of gdp in 2005) minus “inflexible 
obligations”, i.e., social security expenditure (11.4%) 
and interest payments on the public debt (4.5%), is 
currently 14.6% of gdp, having been as low as 10% 
of gdp in 2003.
Some observations should now be made, therefore, 
on the progressivity and redistributive effect of the 
new dual personal income tax (impuesto a la renta de 
las personas físicas—irpf). The figures given in table 
2 are the results of a static microsimulation exercise 
without behaviour functions, carried out using 2004 
microdata from the Continuous Household Survey (ine, 
2004). The methodological details of this exercise can 
be found in Barreix and Roca (2006).
The average rates for both the personal receipts 
tax (irp) and the dual personal income tax (irpf) rise 
as we move up the income scale from the poorest to 
the wealthiest deciles. This rise is far more pronounced 
18 Broadway (2005) summarizes the following arguments in favour of 
reducing the tax on capital income: (i) there is a positive externality 
when investment is linked to innovation, according to the studies 
available on endogenous growth; (ii) there is a systematic tendency 
for saving to be suboptimal, which seems irrational (in practice, it is 
possible that individuals are acting strategically, anticipating that the 
government or a philanthropist will come to their aid); (iii) taxing 
capital income discriminates against households with fluctuating 
incomes that use saving as a way of flattening out their consumption. 
In theory, taxing capital income at a lower rate is equivalent to 
applying different rates to present and future consumption.
19 See Villela, Roca and Barreix (2005).
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in the case of the dual tax, however, something that 
is well borne out by the Kakwani index which, unlike 
the progression of the average rate, is a comprehensive 
indicator of progressivity.20 As table 2 shows, the fact 
that the Kakwani index is higher for the irpf (0.3887) 
than for the irp (0.1973) shows that the former is more 
progressive.
As regards redistribution capacity, this can be 
measured using the Reynolds-Smolensky index, a 
comprehensive indicator of redistribution capacity 
(table 2).21 The index value associated with the dual 
tax (0.0222) is higher than that associated with the 
irp (0.0047), meaning that the former causes an 
improvement in income distribution of more than 2 
points of the Gini coefficient, which is greater than the 
half point improvement in the Gini caused by the irp, 
allowing the irp to be identified as (quasi) neutral. The 
introduction of the dual tax results in a transfer of 2% 
of total income (after the irpf) from the richest 20% 
of households to the other 80%.
The substantially greater redistributive capacity 
of the irpf as against the irp is also seen when the 
respective percentages of the tax take from each decile 
are compared. While the poorest 40% of households 
pay 7.4% of the irp, they will pay 1.7% of the new 
irpf. Meanwhile, the richest 20% of the population 
pay 60.4% of the irp but will pay 80.5% of the irpf. 
While the irp collects 0.87% of gdp, the irpf will 
collect about 2.4%.
Following this analysis, we shall conclude with 
two observations. First, estimation of the effect of the 
tax system in the European Union (15 countries) on 
income distribution for 2001 gives an improvement 
of 2.5 points in the Gini coefficient. When comparing 
this with the dual tax in Uruguay, which, as we have 
seen, entails a drop of 2.2 points in this coefficient, it 
is important to emphasize two aspects that are striking 
in their own right: the higher tax burden entailed by 
personal income tax (progressive and redistributive as 
TABLE 2
uruguay: Personal receipts tax (irp) and dual personal income tax (irpf), by decile
 Effective average rate Proportion of tax’s revenue
 (%) paid by each decile (%)
 irp Dual irpf irp Dual irpf
Decile 1 0.23 0.10 0.3 0.1
Decile 2 0.70 0.22 1.3 0.2
Decile 3 1.05 0.48 2.4 0.5
Decile 4 1.36 0.91 3.5 1.0
Decile 5 1.60 1.31 4.7 1.7
Decile 6 1.84 1.89 6.4 2.8
Decile 7 2.13 2.73 8.6 4.8
Decile 8 2.51 3.94 12.5 8.5
Decile 9 2.89 6.22 19.1 17.8
Decile 10 3.21 11.23 41.3 62.7
Kakwani index 0.1973 0.3887
Reynolds-Smolensky index 0.0047 0.0222
Transfer from wealthiest 10% 0.27% 1.86%
Transfer from wealthiest 20% 0.35% 1.99%
Transfer from wealthiest 50% 0.24% 1.11%
Source: Barreix and Roca (2006).
20 Kakwani index = quasi-Gini (personal income tax) - Gini (income 
prior to fiscal policy). Income prior to fiscal policy, also known as 
autonomous income, is income that has not yet been affected by taxes 
or public transfers. The quasi-Gini for tax is calculated much like 
the Gini for income, but from the tax concentration curve, whence 
the semantic distinction. If K > 0, i.e., if the personal income tax 
is distributed more inequitably than income prior to fiscal policy, 
the effect of tax is to reduce inequality in income distribution and 
it is therefore progressive. If K < 0, on the other hand, the tax is 
regressive.
21 Reynolds-Smolensky (rs) index = Gini (income prior to fiscal 
policy) - Gini (income after personal income tax). If rs > 0, inequality 
in income distribution has diminished since the introduction of the 
personal income tax and this tax will therefore be progressive. The 
opposite holds if rs < 0.
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it is) in the European Union, and the large contribution 
made by it to the total tax revenues of that bloc. The 
redistributive effect of the new dual tax in Uruguay 
should therefore not be underestimated.
Second, given that the reduction in indirect 
taxation resulting from the tax reform22 will be financed 
from the proceeds of the Uruguayan style dual tax, 
what matters is the overall effect of the reform on 
equity. While the pre-reform tax system was regressive 
(Kakwani index = -0.0088), the post-reform system is 
progressive (Kakwani index = 0.0993). Again, while 
the pre-reform tax system worsened income distribution 
(Reynolds-Smolensky index = -0.0012), the new tax 
system clearly improves it (Reynolds-Smolensky 
index = 0.0167). In other words, the introduction 
of the Uruguayan dual tax makes the tax system as 
a whole progressive and redistributive (Barreix and 
Roca, 2006).
V
the pillars of taxation in Latin America: the need 
to collect income tax
1. A simple typology of current tax systems
Tax structures are determined essentially by three 
factors: (i) the country’s paradigm of insertion in 
the international economy; (ii) the level, quality and 
sustainability of public spending; (iii) the performance 
of the tax administration in a broad sense.23 To establish 
a typology of the different tax systems in operation 
today, we propose to identify their main pillars (plus 
complements), by “main pillars” being meant taxes that 
are capable of generating substantial, stable revenues 
and are broadly based, as this enhances their neutrality 
and elasticity.
This typology is dynamic. Thus, for example, 
import taxes were a pillar of taxation after the crisis 
of the late 1920s (the Great Depression) in both 
developed and underdeveloped countries. At that 
time they collected some 25% of tax revenues, but in 
today’s open economies their revenue-raising capacity 
has diminished.
In our view, there are now three pillars of taxation 
and three complements. The three pillars are: (i) income 
tax (strictly speaking, the system of taxation on income); 
(ii) general consumption taxes (vat and other retail 
taxes); (iii) pension contributions (with the variant of 
private-sector and mixed systems). The complements, 
meanwhile, are: (i) taxes on renewable and non-renewable 
natural resources; (ii) taxes on property (particularly 
real estate), personal assets and the transmission of 
wealth (mainly inheritance taxes); and (iii) specific 
consumption taxes.
2. strengthening the pillars of taxation
To guide our analysis, we may compare the main taxes 
underpinning fiscal sustainability in Latin America on 
the one hand and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (oecd) on the other. Table 
3 shows that the greatest differences between these 
two groups of countries are in the areas of personal 
income tax and social security contributions; vat and 
corporation tax, conversely, look fairly alike, despite 
the large disparities in development and income levels 
between the two groups.
We shall not go into the considerations that, in 
our view, rule out any prospect of the taxes we have 
called “complements” becoming pillars of the tax 
system in Latin America. We shall merely note that 
natural resource taxes are highly variable (Jiménez and 
Tromben, 2006), there is a worldwide trend towards the 
abolition of corporate asset taxes and inheritance taxes, 
and selective taxes are severely constrained by the scope 
for smuggling and/or are regressive (the exception 
being vehicle fuel taxes). And while Latin America 
still has work to do in developing taxes on property, 
22 Abolition of the cofis (wholesale vat of 3%), reduction of the 
basic rate of vat from 23% to 22% and of the lower rate from 
14% to 10%.
23 The term “tax administration” is used here in a broader sense than 
the traditional one, referring to what we may call a “system of tax 
institutions”. This system encompasses not only the internal revenue 
agency and customs but also other institutions ranging from land 
and property registries to the judiciary.
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particularly real estate and vehicles, the amount these 
can raise is limited (1% or 2% of gdp).
3. Payroll taxes to finance pensions have no 
future
We believe that the revenue-raising potential of payroll 
taxes to finance pensions is almost nil in Latin America. 
In open, competitive economies with high and rising 
rates of chronic unemployment (around 10% on 
average), the non-capitalizable element of pension 
contributions is just another charge on labour that bears 
down on wages and/or employment.
In the first place, if the results of the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem are borne out by trade liberalization, 
the prices of tradable inputs will tend to equalize and 
countries will export goods that use their abundant 
factor intensively and import goods that use their 
scarce factor intensively. At the same time, the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem states that a rise in the relative 
price of a good will lead to a rise in the return to that 
factor which is used most intensively in the production 
of the good and to a fall in the return to the other 
factor. For the Latin American countries, the result in 
practice is growth in the commodity sector (agricultural 
commodities and non-renewable natural resources) and 
a partial decline in the industrial sector, dominated by 
the Asian countries where labour is abundant.24 The 
economic sectors that have traditionally generated jobs 
in the region, namely industry and formal commerce, 
have seen their share in the composition of gdp decline 
in the last 35 years (4.2% and 6.6%, respectively). 
The factor that has gained is capital (capital-intensive 
primary sectors) and returns on labour have experienced 
a relative decline.
At the same time, there is a tendency to replace 
labour by technology (imf, 2007). In particular, 
advances in agriculture, information technology and 
robotics are reducing the number of unskilled workers. 
It is clear that workers in Latin America, a region 
where public education spending is low (less than 3% 
of gdp) and investment in research and development 
is paltry (0.3% on average), will find it harder and 
harder to compete for work and wages with more 
highly skilled workers not only in the oecd countries 
but also in the new market economies of the former 
Soviet bloc and India.
In view of this, and of the past and potential crises 
in the unfunded pension systems of certain countries, 
the (public) principle of (intergenerational) solidarity 
has been supplemented by a (private) system of strict 
equivalence between contributions and pension levels 
(individual funded system), with a number of countries 
opting for mixed or parallel systems. Although pension 
system pressure is not yet a problem in some Latin 
American countries whose population pyramid still has 
a wide base, there must be concerns about the future.
The fact is that, over the course of two generations 
(1950-1955 period compared to 2000-2005), the gross 
birth rate has fallen by almost 50% (from 42 to 21 per 
1,000 inhabitants) while life expectancy at birth has 
risen by 38% (from 51.8 to 71.9). The result is that 
the labour component in the composition of taxpayers 
will diminish while at the same time the proportion 
of potential recipients (pensioners) will increase 
exponentially, and this will be compounded by the 
burden of pension system debt and the (gross) financial 
debt of the non-financial public sector, estimated to 
average 86% and 48% of gdp, respectively.
TABLE 3
organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (oecd) and Latin America: 
Pillars of taxation, 2004
(Percentages of gross domestic product)
 oecd Latin Americaa
Tax revenueb 35.9 20.2
 Value added tax (vat)c 6.7 5.8
 Income tax 12.5 3.8
  Corporation tax 3.4 2.6
  Personal income tax 9.1 1.2
 Social security contributionsd 9.3 2.8
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(oecd), Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (eclac), Inter-American Development Bank (idb) and 
International Monetary Fund (imf).
a Includes oil revenues in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, minerals in Bolivia and Chile 
and hydroelectricity in Paraguay.
b Includes social security (pensions).
c Includes the tax on goods movements and service provision 
(icsm) in Brazil.
d Includes contributions to public systems.
24 And which apply policies such as managed exchange rates and 
investment incentives, among others, and have lower levels of 
unionization.
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To sum up, the tendencies referred to make it very 
unlikely that payroll taxes to finance pensions can attain 
the level of revenue required to make them a pillar of 
the fiscal structure.
4. vat: good at raising revenue, bad at 
distributing it
In Latin America, quite a number of attempts have 
been made to use exemptions and differential rates to 
give vat an income redistribution role. In our view, the 
outcome of these efforts has not only been marginal 
but has resulted in high tax expenditure that favours 
the wealthiest deciles, wasting resources that could 
indeed have had redistributive effects if targeted on 
public social spending.
The case of Mexico is very revealing in this respect 
(table 4). Mexico’s vat is progressive even when income 
is taken as an indicator of well-being. In the richest 
deciles, for example, 60% of spending is subject to 
the general rate and just 10% to the zero rate, while 
for the poorest deciles these proportions are 41% and 
38%, respectively. Although the tax expenditure implicit 
in this design is 2% of gdp, however, its redistributive 
capacity is slight: after tax there is a transfer of just 
0.15% of total income from the richest 50% to the 
TABLE 4
Latin America (nine countries): Equity of value added tax
(By per capita income decile)
 Colombia Ecuador Argentina Uruguay Mexico Honduras Costa Rica Guatemala Panama
A. Progressivity
Effective tax/income rate (%)
 Poorest decile 10.8 4.6 11.7 9.5 1.1 12.7 5.4 20.2 4.6
 Second poorest decile 8.6 4.2 9.2 8.9 1.6 3.7 4.2 9.1 2.2
Second wealthiest decile 5.4 4.9 7.8 6.8 3.6 2.7 3.5 5.4 1.7
Wealthiest decile 4.7 5.2 6.8 6.1 3.7 2.3 3.0 4.9 1.7
Gini income inequality 
coefficient, prior to vat 0.537 0.408 0.549 0.317 0.433 0.570 0.577 0.596 0.636
Quasi-Gini after vat 0.469 0.445 0.507 0.254 0.547 0.480 0.489 0.460 0.533
Kakwani index (if < 0 => 
regressive; if > 0 => progressive) -0.068 0.038 -0.042 -0.063 0.113 -0.090 -0.089 -0.136 -0.104
B. Redistribution
Gini income inequality 
coefficient, after vat 0.541 0.406 0.555 0.322 0.430 0.575 0.580 0.604 0.638
Transfer from poorest 50% to 
wealthiest 50% (or from 
wealthiest 50% to poorest 50%) -0.20% 0.09% -0.30% -0.25% 0.15% -0.25% -0.16% -0.40% -0.09%
Losers 1 to 6 9 and 10 1 to 9 1 to 6  8 to 10 1 to 8 1 to 9 1 to 9 1 to 7
  and 9   and 8
C. Who pays the tax
Poorest 40% 14% 14% 11% 24% 8% 13% 12% 15% 10%
Wealthiest 20% 55% 52% 62% 35% 59% 54% 56% 53% 58%
Wealthiest 20%/poorest 40%  4.0  3.7  5.4  1.5 7.4 4.2 4.8 3.5 5.6
D. Tax expenditure 
As % of gdp 6.0 2.6 1.6 3.2 2.0 2.3 … 2.4 …
Source: For equity: in Colombia, Zapata and Ariza (2006); in Ecuador, Arteta (2006); in Argentina, Gómez Sabaini, Santieri and Rossignolo 
(2002); in Uruguay, Barreix and Roca (2006); in Mexico, Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (2004); in Honduras, Garriga (2007); 
in Costa Rica, Trejos (2007); in Guatemala, icefi (2007); in Panama, Rodríguez (2007), Barreix and Roca (2007). For tax expenditure: 
in Colombia, 1999 data, Simonit (2002); in Ecuador, 1999 data, Roca and Vallarino (2003); in Argentina, 2001 data, Simonit (2002); in 
Uruguay, 1999 data, Rossa and Roca (2001); in Mexico, Tax Administration Service (2005); in Honduras, Gómez Sabaini (2006); and in 
Guatemala, DevTech (2002).
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poorest 50%. By contrast, personal income tax, which 
collects about 2.4% of gdp, has a redistributive 
effect more than 10 times as great and the “Progresa-
Oportunidades” programme of public spending targeted 
on poverty alleviation achieves a similar redistributive 
effect to vat but at one eighth of the fiscal cost. 
Furthermore, the “progressivity without redistribution” 
of vat has a cost: 54% of the benefits of the zero rate 
go to the highest-income decile and just 3.5% to the 
poorest. It seems clear, for one thing, that abolishing 
this benefit would substantially increase revenues, so 
that the losers could if necessary be compensated out 
of public spending, preventing any major deterioration 
in equity.
Section A of table 4 shows that the regressive effect 
of vat is moderate, section B that its redistributive effect 
is almost nil despite strong revenues, and section C that 
because consumption is concentrated in the highest 
deciles, exemptions have a very high fiscal cost.
In summary, vat is a revenue-raising tax and not 
a redistributive one, which means that it should tend to 
the greatest neutrality and simplicity possible to ensure 
compliance and thus establish itself firmly as a pillar 
of the system, while it needs to be recognized that 
personal income tax excels all others in its redistributive 
potential.
. income tax: the great shortfall
As was shown in table 3 earlier, the amount raised 
by corporation tax in Latin America is close to the 
oecd average: 2.6% and 3.4% of gdp, respectively. 
As already pointed out, however, revenue from income 
tax on sole traders is included in this category in 
Latin America, while in the developed countries it is 
categorized as personal income tax.
Where corporation tax is concerned, it is a fact 
that capital mobility has not only brought down nominal 
rates around the world, but forms of special treatment 
designed to attract capital have proliferated and these, 
in combination with tax planning, have eroded the tax 
base. Economic liberalization and the integration of 
markets have produced some structural changes in the 
tax that are not going to be reversed. For example, in 
1918 corporation tax in the United States yielded four 
times as much as personal income tax, which only 
affected the wealthiest; around 1950 both taxes yielded 
the same; but by 1980 physical persons were paying 
about four times as much as businesses, and this remains 
the case to this day. What we seem to be looking at is 
a global phenomenon, with relatively weak and non-
cooperating national States in a very poor position to 
tax corporate income.
By contrast, personal income tax in Latin America 
raises barely 1.2% of gdp on average (see table 3 above). 
This tax, which is predominantly synthetic, riddled with 
exemptions and “dualized” in an inconsistent way to 
the benefit of capital income, is highly progressive 
but has a very limited capacity for redistribution, as 
the low revenues yielded by it would indicate. For 
example, only in Mexico does it bring down the Gini 
income inequality coefficient by more than 1 point of 
that coefficient (table 5).
When we are dealing with countries where the 
income share of the richest 20% is more than five 
times that of the poorest 40%, it seems clear that a 
reformulation of the tax, taking into consideration 
the new forms discussed here, would raise more 
revenue and thus allow greater redistribution. Indeed, 
in Uruguay, where income distribution is relatively 
equitable by regional standards (the share of the 
richest 20% is 3.6 times that of the poorest 40%), 
it is estimated that the new dual tax will reduce the 
Gini coefficient by 2.2%, in line with the developed 
countries (the transfer from the richest 10% is almost 
2% of total income).
It is clear, then, that the great taxation shortfall 
in the region derives from the situation with personal 
income tax. It is only fair to acknowledge that it will be 
impossible to attain the levels of revenue raised by the 
mass taxes in the developed countries, where average per 
capita income at purchasing power parity is four times 
that of Latin America, while financial income is almost 
eight times as high. It must be realized, however, that 
our proposal for Uruguay concentrates the tax burden 
on the two wealthiest deciles, making it appropriate for 
a region where, as we have pointed out, the richest 20% 
across Latin America receive some 60% of total income 
while the poorest 40% receive an average of barely more 
than 10%. Since open regionalism was implemented 
in the early 1990s, furthermore, this average ratio of 
5.5 to 1 has remained unchanged, even as income has 
increased by almost 60%.
As a corollary to the considerations set out in this 
section, there is a vital need for efficient collection of 
the revenue from the income tax system, especially the 
personal income component. This component is essential 
not just as a revenue-raising pillar with the potential for 
growth to finance ever-increasing physical and social 
infrastructure needs, but also as the tax with the greatest 
redistributive capacity. That is a crucial consideration in 
a region where the world’s longest-standing and acutest 
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income inequality coexists with a high level of poverty.25 
Personal income tax, then, can be an important element 
of social cohesion in Latin America, since inequality 
prior to fiscal policy is worsening both in developing 
countries and in those of the oecd. Tax revenue raised 
from the highest deciles can be used to finance targeted 
spending on the lowest, thereby providing opportunities 
for the least privileged. At the same time, payment of 
such an individual tax not only strengthens taxpayers’ 
relationship with the State but legitimizes their demands 
for better public services.
To sum up, in the medium term the taxation basis 
for fiscal sustainability in Latin America will have just 
two pillars: vat and the system for taxing income. 
To show responsibility, therefore, the region ought 
to renew the mainstays of its tax system, particularly 




Latin America (10 countries): the equity of personal income taxa
 Uruguay Colombia Ecuador Peru B.R. of Honduras Costa Rica Guatemala Panama Mexico
     Venezuela
 (2004)  (2003) (2003) (2000)  (2003) (2004)  (2004) (2000) (2003) (2003)
Gini income inequality 
coefficient prior to the tax 37.6 53.7 40.8 53.5 42.3 56.9 60.2 59.6  63.6 43.3
Gini coefficient after the tax 35.4 53.4 40.3 53.5 42.1 56.4 59.4 59.5 63.1 39.6
Change in Gini coefficient 2.22 0.30 0.45 0.03 0.19 0.50 0.74 0.11 0.53 3.71
Wealthiest decile: % of 
income prior to the tax 30.00 44.5 29.9 41.2 41.9 45.1 49.4 49.3 51.3 33.1
Wealthiest decile: % of 
income after the tax 28.20 43.7 29.4 41.1 41.7 44.4 48.7 49.2 50.1 29.7
Change -1.80 -0.80 -0.50 -0.10 -0.20 -0.76 -0.68 -0.13 -1.18 -3.40
Revenue from the tax, 
2004 (% of gdp) 2.4 1.2 … 1.2 0.4 1.3 1.3 0.4 2.0 2.4
Source: Uruguay, Barreix and Roca (2006); Colombia, Zapata and Ariza (2006); Ecuador, Arteta (2006); Peru, Haughton (2006); Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, García and Salvato (2006); Honduras, Garriga (2007); Costa Rica, Trejos (2007); Guatemala, icefi (2007); Panama, 
Rodríguez (2007); Mexico, Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (2004) and Barreix and Roca (2007).
a The years in brackets below the names of the countries are those of the surveys used to prepare the estimates.
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